I know my opponents exact value bet to bluff ratio on the river and i"m getting 1 to 1 odds on a call. say the ratio is 60/40 what is the formula to determine how often i should call
I know my opponents exact value bet to bluff ratio on the river and i"m getting 1 to 1 odds on a call. say the ratio is 60/40 what is the formula to determine how often i should call
For the sake of clarification i'm not talking about pot odds. I want to know what my calling frequency should be in order to become indifferent to whether he is bluffing or value betting. Actually that isn't exactly right as being indifferent would mean it doesn't matter how often he is betting/bluffing. so i want to know how often i need to call to his strategy of value betting 60 percent and bluffing 40 percent 0ev or as close to 0 ev as possible.
Note: You can't answer this question without using pot odds.
If you need to brush up on EV calculations, start here
http://www.flopturnriver.com/poker-s...cenarios-20795
This is fundamentally important to studying poker, so I heartily recommend you become a practiced expert at the most common EV calculations - like calling an all-in. At the very least, you should know deep down inside that the pot odds can't be ignored, since they are of great importance to your calling range.
When you're solid on EV calculations, go here
http://www.flopturnriver.com/poker-s...l-ranges-20883
This is a theoretical way of thinking about poker ranges. If you put in a few hours to understand it, then it will give you the methods and framework to solve this kind of question yourself. Using this method takes less time than if you were to more rigidly force the model to remain true to the actual game of poker.
If you don't understand this second article at first, don't sweat it. Just bring us your questions and be willing to post a specific hand from your HH to help us link the theoretical concepts to the practical scenario.
Thank you for the reply. I can actually do basic pot odds but am trying to expand into the realm of GTO and MDF. Neither of which care about pot odds. We're trying to make his bluffing ev 0
I think the formula is c=1-alpha i just have no idea what alpha is
alpha is {total risk}/{total reward}
In poker, {bet} is the amount you have to call, and {pot} is the amount of dead money prior to that bet.
So {bet} is your total risk, and {bet} + {pot} is the total reward.
Therefore pot odds = {bet}/({bet} + {pot}) = {total risk}/{total reward} = alpha
I hope I have disabused you of the notion that pot odds is somehow outside of the discussion.
It's just that in Game Theory, the language is to talk about all games, in general, whereas you want to take that general knowledge and apply it to a specific (poker).
I don't know what MDF is aside from Medium Density Fiberboard.
Yes... er... kinda... We're trying to make the most +EV calling range possible. Ultimately, we expect to beat 100% of his bluffing range and hopefully some % of his value range, too.
In order to do that, we will calculate what is the hand in our range which has 0 EV to call. We will call with that hand and all better hands.
Read this article and apply this formal approach to a specific hand and work it out. If you're unsure how to go through the process, then do as much as you can and ask for help when needed. I will walk you through the process.
http://www.flopturnriver.com/poker-s...l-ranges-20883
MDF = minimum defense frequencies
Was gonna post a couple links explain GTO but it wouldn't let me. GTO is something i'm new at but is short it's nash equilibrium.
GTO is rarely the highest EV choice but it will never be worse then 0 ev
well i thought the 2 were closely related. Does nash not exist if both players are playing a perfect GTO strat? As far as taking it slowly it isn't easy to find a lot of info on GTO. Sure you can find all types of links explaining what is thing is they don't always For example one link might give the DEF that GTO is playing perfect poker. By perfect i mean playing in a way that can not be exploited. Then i'll read another link that says you shouldn't even use GTO versus bad players
We know what Game Theory is. We know what GTO is. We know what Nash equilibrium is. Links wouldn't hurt, but they're probably not as necessary as you imagine.
Yes, Nash equilibrium is achieved when both player are playing a GTO strat. In the case that both are optimal, then any deviation from their strategy is to a lesser strategy.
When you change your unexploitable (GTO) strategy to exploit a fish, then you become exploitable. This is because the fish was nowhere near playing a GTO line, and so you change your GTO line to exploit this deviation. Which means that you are using an exploitable line.
Don't worry about that. You aren't using that exploitable line against anyone but the fish who motivated it.
Seriously... post a hand where you faced an all-in call and you were not sure whether or not to call with a medium strength hand.
The meta game can be important too. If it is early on in a cash game with observant players then you may also want to think about how the decisions impact your image. Maybe you occasionally go slightly -EV with small, early pots if it can setup your image for big pots later on.
ok well i would post a HH but i play at a web based site. U can C&P your HH to a text file if you remember but it's difficult to read. I just spent a good while looking through the text file where i keep my hands. A lot of the Vs have a fold to cbet % of 70 or higher yet their fold to DB is less then 15%. I usually bet 2/3 pot on the flop whether bluff of value bet. I think we find the proper bluff frequency by bet/bet+bet+pot so if u bet 2/3 the proper frequency is 43 percent for them to make my bluffs indifferent they need to call 60 percent. So they're folding 10 percent to much. So wouldn't it be a good idea to cbet our air atleast 50 percent of the time and if they call only DB with made hands and big draws. Don't we exploit Vs who fold more then what is proper by raising more then what is proper?
i'm really just asking once we know our opponent is folding to much what is a good min exploitative strat.
Put yourself in his position and figure out how often he would need you to fold to a bluff for his bluff to be 0EV. That's how often you should fold for GTO etc
It's just the size of the bet you're facing divided by the size of the pot after he's made that bet.
Also I have a lot of game theory posts in my old FTR column at http://www.flopturnriver.com/author/spoonitnow/
Go back through the pages and you'll find them ez
So up until then, exploit the crap out of them. Furthermore, they frequently adjust to an even more exploitable strategy.
Am I missing your point?
Hero shall not adjust prior to the evidence that Villain is adjusting, though. That would be throwing away EV.
Hero shall not just automatically assume that Villains' adjustments mean that Hero needs to adjust. They frequently do mean that, but not always.
well i currently cbet air 70 percent in HU pots would be higher but it's difficult to fire 10 high on a str8ing monotone board or 1 that contains multiple broadway cards. I play at a unique site that has an average fold to cbet of around 80 percent.
i'm just worried if i get even more agro someone might wise up and start raising my cbets with air.
This stat reflects your many different adjustments to many different villains. It is an average over all of your strategies, and not your strategy, if you follow.
You should be varying this number in every hand based on all the usual factors: position, stack sizes, Villain's ranges, board texture, etc.
I'm worried that if you keep finding excuses to avoid taking the maximum +EV line at every opportunity you'll be at the micros wondering why you can't move up in stakes for a long, long time.
Worrying over something that hasn't happened yet is only useful if that worry inspires you to be more prepared. So let that worry compel you to do the study to be prepared.
Will they bet their air with a frequency that doesn't screw themselves? Will they be sensible in their bet sizes as they make this adjustment? Will they respond to 3-bets like a tool?
All of these are important questions. You won't know the exact answers until and if Villain actually does "wise up." By exploring how you would respond to each of the potential leaks in their adjustments, you will adjust right along with them in a way that keeps you maximizing your EV.
Besides, if you're not the one to be max exploiting the fish, then another shark will do it. Eventually, the fish will feel that pressure to adjust. The question is: Will the money they lose learning that lesson go to you or someone else?